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This article concentrates on three major questions in
the area of trade and exchange rate policy raised by the
Accelerated Development Report (World Bank 1981)
and debate since its publication. First, would
increasing the volume of agricultural exports from
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lead to increased or
reduced foreign exchange income for SSA? Second, is
food self-sufficiency a sensible (and practicable) aim
for SSA? Third, are the conditions for successful
devaluation present in SSA?
Increasing Agricultural Exports
The Accelerated Development Report (World Bank
1981) endorses FAO and OAU targets for growth of
African agricultural production as a whole of 3.9 per
cent a year for 1980-85 and 4.2 per cent for 1985-90,
which would represent a tripling of the growth rate
achieved in the 1970s (pp49-50). It also sets out its
projections for the growth in the volume of world
trade in the 1980s, as in Table 1, with the comment that
'Africa's share of world trade in most commodities
could be increased with relatively small effects on
prices' (p23). Thus, by implication, growth in output
of export crops at rates higher than those shown in
Table 1 would result in an increase in foreign exchange
income from these crops by SSA.
One defence of this hypothesis needs to be dismissed at
the outset as unsatisfactory. This is the suggestion that
it was never intended or expected that all SSA
countries would follow the advice to increase
agricultural exports [Please and Amoako 1983:17].
The advice to increase the volume of agricultural
exports was given to the whole of SSA. In judging
whether that is sensible advice the question of whether
or not it will be followed is irrelevant. The only
rational basis for such ajudgement is to assume that it
will be followed and then assess the consequences. If it
were intended that only some countries producing
some commodities should follow the advice, while
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Table I
Projected Annual Average Growth Rates in Volume of
World Trade in Selected Commodities, 1980-1990
(per cent)
Weighted by percentage share of African merchandise
exports, 1976-78.
Sources: Calculated from World Bank 1981: Table 3.6.
others should ignore it, that should have been made
explicit, which it certainly is not in the Report.
A fair test of the hypothesis that volume growth will
lead to income growth is a comparison, for each
commodity, of (a) SSA's share of world exports with
(b) world price elasticity of demand for that
commodity. If(b) exceeds (a) it can be concluded that
SSA can safely expand output and exports of the
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Coffee 2.3
Cocoa 3.7
Sugar 2.5
Tea 2.5
Groundnuts 1.8
Groundnut oil 2.1
Palm oil 8.2
Beef 5.3
Bananas 3.1
Maize 1.3
Total Food and Beverages 2.8!
Timber 3.3
Cotton 1.0
Tobacco 3.5
Rubber 3.4
Total Non food Primary 2.51
Table 2
Sub-Saharan Africa's Share of World Exports of Selected Commodities Compared with Price Elasticities ofDemand
IC = industrial countries; LDC less developed countries; CPE = centrally planned economies.
2 Course grains (including barley, oats, rye, Sorghum and millet as well as maize).
Source: Columns (1) and (2), FAO Trade Yearbook, 1982; Column (3), World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary
Commodities, Volumes Il and III, July 1982.
commodity in question, unless there is a strong
presumption that this would lead to a retaliatory
increase in exports by non-SSA producers that would
not otherwise have occurred. Table 2 assembles all
readily available data relevant to this question.
As can be seen, in the case of two commodities, coffee
and cocoa, sub-Saharan Africa's share of world
exports is higher than world price elasticity of
demand. In these two cases an increase in the volume
of SSA's exports would certainly lead to a fall in
income. Two more commodities, sugar and tea, are on
the margin. Even though SSA's share of world sugar
exports is small, price elasticities in industrial-country
and LDC markets are even smaller. Only in centrally
planned economies would an export drive not result in
a fall in earnings, and then only narrowly. Such
economies also represent the most promising markets
for SSA's tea: from the price-elasticity point of view
LDCs could not absorb more SSA's tea without a
proportional fall in price, and even in industrial-
country markets price elasticity is dangerously low. In
two further cases, groundnut oil and sisal, we have no
information on price elasticities, but SSA's share of
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world exports is so high that there is a strong
presumption that elasticities will be lower.
In short, in the case of two commodities which
account for over 49 per cent of SSA's earnings from
agricultural exports, coffee and cocoa, an increase in
the volume of SSA exports would definitely result in a
fall in earnings. If groundnut oil and sisal are added to
the list, the proportion of SSA's agricultural export
earnings affected by the fallacy of composition rises to
51 per cent; and if the two commodities on the margin,
tea and sugar, are added, it rises to 61 per cent.
Moreover, these calculations implicitly assume that
the expansion of agricultural exports is costless. If the
costs of such expansion were alsq taken into account,
the proportion would be even higher.
This means that those who prescribe an across-the-
board increase in the volume of agricultural exports as
part of a strategy of structural adjustment for SSA
should modify their prescription considerably. The
emphasis, rather, should be on divers,Jïcation of
products, from 'high-share' to 'low-share', and of
(1)
Volume of
SSA Exports
1982
(2)
Share of
World
Exports
(3)
Estimated
Price Elasticity
of Demand
('000 tonnes) 1982 (%) 1982
Coffee 1055 27.3 0.24
Cocoa 799 65.1 0.3
Sugar 1718 5.5 0.05 (IC) 0.05 (LDC) 0.06 (CPE)!
Tea 176 19.5 0.3 (IC) 0.2 (LDC) 0.5 (CPE)
Groundnuts 151 19.9
Groundnut Oil 161 39.5
Beef 35 1.0
Palm Oil 94 2.5
Bananas 189 2.7 0.1 to 0.6
Maize 359 0.5 0.4 (IC) 0.3 (LDC) 0.0 (CPE)2
Cotton 401 9.0
Tobacco 143 10.1 0.77
Rubber 138 4.5
Sisal 117 71.5
markets, from low-elasticity to high-elasticity. Even
then institutions adopting a world view would need to
guard against substituting a global for a sub-
continental fallacy of composition by advising
diversification into products which non-SSA exporters
are also advised to expand. In the long run, of course,
the less efficient producers will be shaken out, but
advice that will increase the pain of such a process
should surely be avoided.
Food Self-Sufficiency
The Accelerated Development Report's position on
food self-sufficiency is not entirely clear, as Green has
pointed out: 'It havers on food self-sufficiency,
intuitively supporting it, almost pulling back (e.g.
page 65) on the basis of its commitment to letting short
run global market prices decide and pushing exports,
and also arguing (pages 62-3) that food and
export/industrial crops are complementary anyhow'
[Green 1983:31].
Please and Amoako stress that: 'self-sufficiency in
staple foodstuffs is an objective which the Bank fully
Market gardening thrives in Nairobi.
accepts' [1983:10], subject to three major qualifi-
cations. First, the desirability of achieving total food
self-sufficiency, regardless of cost, the effect on
demand of subsidies and the nature of the
beneficiaries, is questioned. Second, research into
basic foodcrops needed to shift comparative advantage
away from export crops will take time and,
meanwhile, it will be necessary to import some staple
food. Third, food and export crops appear to be
complements rather than substitutes, which suggests
that policy (e.g. on pricing) should be concerned with
the agricultural sector as a whole, and that increases in
the efficiency of exporting arrangements could also
benefit food output.
Sender and Smith on the other hand maintain that
'what matters is how much people have to eat, which is
not determined by whether countries import food or
not' [1984:8]. Most economists would agree in
principle with that statement, which is in the same
spirit as Sen's point that famines reflect not
inadequate food production but inadequate 'entitle-
ments' to food on the part of the hungry [Sen 1980].
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African heads of state take a different view, however.
The Lagos Plan of Action, endorsed by them in 1980,
identified as the objective for the first half of the
decade that of bringing about 'an immediate
improvement in the food situation and[layingl the
foundations for the achievement of self-sufficiency in
cereals and in livestock and fish products' [United
Nations 1980:12]. The heads of state put particular
emphasis on the need for food security: 'urgent steps
should be taken by every Member State to adopt a
coherent national food security policy. National
policies must be translated into concrete actions such
as early construction of storage facilities, creation of
grain reserves, improvement of grain stock manage-
ment and better forecasting and early warning
systems' [ibid.: 13].
Like the many other governments in the world which
try to limit food imports, African governments want
self-sufficiency in staple foods for a variety of reasons
of varying credibility. For one thing, food, the
ultimate basis of survival in a sense that other
commodities are not, is a weapon of international
politics and, as governments see it, vulnerability and
susceptibility to pressure are increased by a need to
import it on a large scale. These strategic/political
worries are reinforced by the volatility and unreliability
of the far from competitive world grain market [see
World Bank 1982:55] which make domestic pro-
duction look the safest basis for food security.
Internally governments are concerned about the
adverse consequences for them of failing to ensure an
adequate supply of staple food of the type which is
currently demanded. The food that is available on the
international market often does not correspond
exactly to local tastes. In Kenya, for instance,
American yellow maize of the type that is imported
during recurring food crises is thought fit only to be
fed to cattle. Of course, tastes are changing away from
Table 3
Volume of Cereal Imports, Selected African Countries, 1970-1982
('000 tonnes)
Source: FAO Trade Yearbooks.
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traditional staples, but, meanwhile, shortages and
food queues are not seen as the best recipe for political
survival.
In any case, if food and export crop production are
complementary [World Bank 1981; Please and
Amoako 1983], the economic cost of achieving the
partly political objective of staple food self-sufficiency
may be fairly small. In this respect the argument that
'the SSA countries which increased food imports most
rapidly in the 1970s were among the fastest growing'
[Sender and Smith, 1984:8] is weak. Of Kenya, Ivory
Coast, Nigeria and Ghana, for example, only Nigeria
shows a strong secular upward trend in cereal imports,
as Table 3 shows.
Apart from this special case, which suffered its own
version of the 'Dutch disease' (de-agriculturalisation
due to a surfeit of oil-based foreign exchange),
fluctuations in food imports seem to be more closely
related to fluctuations in weather than to anything
else. Until the droughts of the late 1970s and early
1980s Ghana's food imports were growing at least as
fast as the Ivory Coast's and faster than Kenya's.
Moreover, if food self-sufficiency is taken to mean
self-sufficiency in basic foodcrops, this point becomes
even stronger. Consider, for instance, the pattern of
Kenya's imports of maize, as shown in Table 4.
This is the pattern of a basically maize-self-sufficient
economy (which in fact exports substantial quantities
in most years) which from time to time runs into crises.
For instance the huge, temporary imports of maize in
1980 and 1981 reflect managerial ineptitude in a single
year (1979/80), when huge accumulated stocks were
exported by the marketing board at a time of sudden,
acute, local shortage.
1970 197] 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Kenya 2.7 6.3 7.2 5.1 1.5 8.6 1.2 6.0 10.0 2.2 38.7 14.9 19.4
Ivory
Coast 18.4 13.1 17.2 29.2 17.5 8.2 12.1 31.8 30.8 36.1 46.9 57.3 59.2
Nigeria 31.8 44.9 35.6 44.2 38.9 47.7 86.2 139.8 200.8 133.3 177.6 244.1 228.0
Ghana 14.3 8.5 11.3 14.1 17.7 8.5 10.9 29.0 26.9 19.5 21.1 25.9 21.1
Table 4
1970 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
14.3 29.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4
Source: FAO Trade Yearbooks.
In short, attempts to show that the SSA countries
which increased food imports most rapidly in the
1970s were among the fastest growing do not seem to
be helpful to the argument that food imports (and
particularly staple food imports) are a Good Thing.
Exchange Rate Policy
Devaluation, described as 'a powerful tool for
restructuring relative prices and incentives' [World
Bank 198 1:30] is a central element in the Accelerated
Development trade and exchange rate policy package.
It is preferred to alternatives such as export subsidies
on the grounds that it is likely to involve a less severe
fiscal and administrative burden. The claims that are
made for it are virtually irresistible:
Devaluation permits higher prices to be paid to
exporters without subsidies. If tariff reduction and
relaxation of import restrictions are accompanied
by devaluation, prices for import-substitute
production can remain constant in local currency,
thus easing adjustment for local producers.
Devaluation, combined with tariff reduction or
relaxation of import restrictions, enables the full
effect of the exchange-rate change to be con-
centrated on exports [World Bank 198 1:30].
Please and Amoako stress the 'widespread failure to
recognise that exchange rate policy is one of the most
pervasive instruments of development policy'
[1983:22].
They make the interesting point that the objectives of
food self-sufficiency and African economic integration,
emphasised in the Lagos Plan of Action, will be
difficult to achieve if the foreign exchange to buy food
and manufactured goods from non-African sources
continues to be so cheap and, therefore, imported
goods are so frequently at a price advantage over
domestic output and over goods from other African
countries. 'African integration', they suggest, 'can
only be encouraged by making it more profitable for
Volume of Maize Imports, Kenya, 1970-82
('000 tonnes)
consumers, farmers, artisans, industrialists within
African countries to trade with each other rather than
with the rest of the world' [Please and Amoako
1983: 23].
Sender and Smith also accuse critics of Accelerated
Development of having a dogmatically negative
attitude towards devaluation and, therefore, of
avoiding consideration of 'the most important
question, which is: under what circumstances would
devaluation increase foreign exchange earnings?'
[1984:91. Most important, perhaps, they stress the
need to analyse the domestic inflationary consequences
of devaluation, as well as its contractionary
implications:
There are countries which can devalue effectively,
as shown by a considerable change in their balance
of payments. There are also other countries which
cannot devalue effectively because they lack the
necessary discipline to keep money costs under
control in the face of increased prices of imports
[Lewis 1972:235].
The question is whether the countries of SSA belong to
the first category of potentially effective devaluers or
to the second. The AcceleratedDevelopment Report is
optimistic on the basis of experience in non-SSA
developing countries [World Bank 198 1:30]. It cites a
study by Cooper (1971) of 24 devaluations which
found that, on average, consumer prices increased by
less than half the amount of the devaluation in the
following year, while manufacturing wages increased
by less than one fourth; and another by Krueger(1978)
which found that devaluation tended to reduce
inflation rates below what they would otherwise have
been.
Actual experience in SSA countries appears to be less
promising. The World Bank's 1983 progress report on
SSA [World Bank 1983:9] concludes that exchange
rate changes in African economies:
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1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
0.03 0.03 0.08 0.02 323.9 77.4 0.0
Table 5
Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rate Changes, Selected African Countries, 1977-82
Source: World Bank 1983. Table 5, page 9.
have been widely negated by the failure to hold other
incomes in check thus leading to an inflationary
situation. This conclusion is particularly worrying in
respect of countries such as Kenya, Mauritius,
Somalia and Madagascar (see Table 5 below), which
have been pursuing a relatively active exchange rate
policy but where quite large depreciations in nominal
effective rates have still left the real effective rate either
appreciated or only slightly devalued.
The differences between the changes in these nominal
and real effective rates are attributable to differences
in rates of price inflation between the SSA countries
and their trading partners. Table 6 isolates one
element in this process, domestic price inflation, and
compares the progress of exchange rate and consumer
price indices for three of the 'active-exchange-rate-
policy' countries over the 1977-83 period, with
monthly indices for 1981 onwards.
For Kenya and Mauritius the value of the domestic
currency vis-à-vis the dollar has drifted downward
throughout the period. In addition, four devaluations
can be identified from the Table: between September
and October 1981 and between November and
December 1982, in the case of Kenya; between August
and September 1981 in Mauritius; and between June
and July 1982 in Somalia.
The speed with which the devaluations have been
eroded by domestic price inflation has varied. The
September 1981 devaluation in Kenya resulted in a 9.4
per cent increase in the shilling price ofthe dollar in the
following month and by September 1982 the rate of
increase in this price over a year earlier was 16.8 per
cent. The annual rate of increase in consumer prices
over the same period was 22.3 per cent, more than
negating the devaluation. Moreover, in Kenya's case
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there was an acceleration of domestic price inflation.
By August 1982 the annual rate of inflation was almost
11 percentage points higher than it had been a year
earlier. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the
devaluation added enough to the inflation rate to
negate itself within less than a year.
The experience of Mauritius and Somalia was less
extreme. In Mauritius the August 1981 devaluation
produced an initial 18.1 per increase in the rupee price
ofthe dollar and by August 1982 the rate of increase in
this price over a year earlier was 25.3 per cent. The
annual rate of increase in consumer prices over the
same period was only 11.3 per cent, and by June 1983
it was only 5.3 per cent. In Somalia, the June 1982
devaluation was much larger, raising the shilling price
ofthe dollar by 141.6 per cent. In the first year after the
devaluation consumer prices rose by only 35 per cent.
Thus in these two cases the process of erosion of
devaluation by domestic inflation seems to have been
arrested.
These experiences suggest that dogmatic views,
whether negative or positive, about the possibility of
effective devaluation in SSA are unwarranted and that
a detailed comparative study of these cases and others
would be worthwhile. Such a study would throw light
on, among other things, the mechanism whereby
devaluations are transmitted to domestic price levels.
One such mechanism that is often emphasised, real
wage resistance, does not seem to have been
important, at least in the Kenyan and Mauritian cases,
to judge from Table 6.
Between 1977 and 1982 real manufacturing wages in
Kenya fell by 18.4 per cent and in Mauritius by 14.1
per cent. Between 1981 and 1982, when Kenya's
nominal effective exchange rate fell by 7.7 per cent and
Mauritius's by 4.1 per cent, their real manufacturing
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
1977 1980 1981 1982
Real Effective Exchange Raie
1977 1980 1981 1982
Kenya 100 98 91 84 lOO 108 lOO 100
Mauritius 100 76 73 70 100 100 97 95
Madagascar 100 104 97 78 100 113 122 133
Somalia 100 90 75 58 100 142 153 124
Table 6
Indices of Non-agricultural and Manufacturing Wages, Kenya and Mauritius, 1977-82
Source: JLO Yearbook of Labour Sto/mies.
wages fell by 7.8 per cent and 7.7 per cent respectively.
Clearly in neither country are money wage increases,
in compensation for devaluation-induced import price
increases, an adequate explanation for the consumer
price increases that followed. Nor do available data on
CPI indices and wage rates elsewhere in SSA since
1979 suggest that they are in any way atypical.
A more convincing explanation. at least in Kenya's
case, may be in terms of the capacity of producers to
pass on quickly increases in the costs of imported
inputs to consumers. In early 1982 several Kenyan
manufacturers cited the devaluation as a direct cause
of price increases. For instance, the managing director
of Firestone (EA) Ltd. which has a monopoly of the
Kenyan home market, attributed a 14 per cent price
increase to an increase of around 18 per cent in the
price of imported petrochemicals as a result of the
devaluation. The lag between devaluation and price
increase was only 10 weeks, the time taken for raw
material inventories to be exhausted (The Standard,
Nairobi, 20 February 1982). If the devaluation had
been accompanied, as the Accelerated Development
Report envisaged, by a relaxation of import
restrictions, this might have made it more difficult for
manufacturers to pass on price increases. But, as is
usually the case, the background to this devaluation
was one of acute foreign exchange crisis and tightening
of import restrictions. In any case ways of increasing
the competitiveness of the import-substituting sector
which will not pose an immediate threat to its survival
need to be found [see Godfrey 1983] and are, perhaps,
a precondition for effective devaluation in some
countries.
Conclusions
This article represents clearing of ground for future
empirical work rather than an attempt to reach
definitive conclusions, but several suggestive results
have emerged.
First, the accusation that theAcceleratedDevelopment
Report in its prescription for SSA to increase the
volume of its agricultural exports is guilty of the
'fallacy of composition' is substantially correct. More
than 60 per cent of SSA's agricultural export earnings
appear to come from commodities for which price
elasticity of demand is such that an increase in export
volume would reduce export earnings. Thus the
emphasis should, rather, be on diversification of
agricultural exports and of markets rather than on
mere expansion.
Second, food self-sufficiency is an understandable aim
and self-sufficiency in basic foodcrops may be the
safest basis for food security. Attempts to show that
the SSA countries which increased food imports most
rapidly in the 1970s were among the fastest growing
are found to be unconvincing.
A review of the devaluation experience of three SSA
countries which have been pursuing a relatively active
exchange rate policy suggests that dogmatic views,
whether negative or positive, about the possibility of
effective devaluation in SSA are unwarranted. The
Kenyan September 1981 devaluation added enough to
the inflation rate to negate itself in less than a year. In
Somalia and Mauritius, on the other hand, the process
of erosion of devaluation by domestic inflation seems
to have been arrested. Real wage resistance does not
seem to have been an important mechanism in the
process whereby devaluations are transmitted to
domestic price levels.
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